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WHEN SHOULD THE TRIER OF FACT DETERMINE THE
VALIDITY OF PERSONAL INJURY RELEASES?-Bennett v.
Shinoda Floral, Inc., 108 Wash. 2d 386, 739 P.2d 648 (1987).
In Bennett v. Shinoda Floral, Inc., 1 the Washington Supreme Court
departed from a national trend toward flexibility in permitting avoid-
ance of personal injury releases.2 The plaintiffs in Bennett had signed
releases of all claims, known and unknown. The plaintiffs were una-
ware of the extent or consequences of their injuries, but they had
signed knowing that the injuries were not yet healed.3 The court held
that the releases were binding because the plaintiffs had assumed the
risk of any unforeseen consequences.
The Bennett opinion followed two lines of analysis. First, the court
held that the validity of a release is an issue of fact only if the injured
person was unaware of any injury at the time of release.' Second, the
court held that under contract law a mistake about the extent or con-
sequences of an injury was not grounds for avoiding an unambiguous
release.' The decision left open the question of whether a release binds
a person who knows of an injury but is unaware of a separate, collat-
eral injury.
Personal injury releases warrant an exception to the general rule
that an unambiguously worded contract is binding7 because the
releases deal with compensation for personal harm rather than pure
economic losses. Washington courts, in assessing the validity of
releases, could incorporate the competing public policy interests of
finality of settlements and compensation for the injured into a two-part
test. Under this test, the trier of fact would first determine whether a
latent injury8 was reasonably related to some injury known at the time
1. 108 Wash. 2d 386, 739 P.2d 648 (1987).
2. See, eg., Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal. 2d 97, 378 P.2d 579, 28 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1963); Gleason
v. Guzman, 623 P.2d 378 (Colo. 1981), noted in Note, The Enforceability of Personal Injury
Releases, 54 U. CoLO. L. REv. 277 (1983); Ranta v. Rake, 91 Idaho 376, 421 P.2d 747 (1966);
Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537 (1957); Finch v. Carlton, 84 Wash. 2d 140, 524
P.2d 898 (1974). Contra, eg., Bernstein v. Kapneck, 290 Md. 452,430 A.2d 602 (1981), noted in
Note, Unambiguous Personal Injury Release Bars Suit for Subsequently Discovered Injuries 41
MD. L. REv. 478 (1982).
3. Bennett, 108 Wash. 2d at 388, 739 P.2d at 649.
4. Id at 395-97, 739 P.2d at 653-54.
5. Id at 392-96, 739 P.2d at 651-53.
6. Id at 396-97, 739 P.2d at 653-54.
7. Emrich v. Connell, 105 Wash. 2d 551, 555-56, 716 P.2d 863, 866 (1986) (quoting Buyken
v. Ertner, 33 Wash. 2d 334, 341, 205 P.2d 628, 632 (1949)).
8. "Latent injuries" indicates injuries, complications, or symptoms that were not known at
the time that a personal injury release was executed.
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of release. If so, the release would be binding. If not, the trier of fact
would determine whether the release was fairly and knowingly made.
The test would be consistent with the dictates of fair and efficient risk
allocation and the results of prior Washington Supreme Court
decisions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Conflicting Analyses of Personal Injury Releases
State laws conflict about whether personal injury releases may be
avoided by a plaintiff who develops injuries that were not evident
when the release was executed. Most courts adopt one of two basic
approaches. Under the first approach courts apply traditional objec-
tive contract analysis to personal injury releases. These courts will not
void a release unless reason can be shown under contract doctrine.9
Courts following the second approach either modify or disregard con-
tract analysis. The latter courts reason that because personal injury
claims are qualitatively different from commercial contract remedies,
the court should look outside the terms of the release to determine
whether the release was fairly and knowingly made.' 0
1. Contract Analysis of Personal Injury Releases
The traditional, objective contract analysis looks only at the terms
of a release to determine whether the injured person bargained to
assume the risk of latent injury." The need for finality of settlements
undergirds this approach.2 A court applying objective contract anal-
ysis will uphold a release as a matter of law unless it was executed
pursuant to a mutual mistake of material fact' 3 or obtained through
fraud, misrepresentation, or overreaching.' 4
9. E.g., Bernstein v. Kapneck, 290 Md. 452, 430 A.2d 602 (1981).
10. E.g., Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal. 2d 97, 378 P.2d 579, 28 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1963); Ranta v.
Rake, 91 Idaho 376, 421 P.2d 747 (1966).
11. See, e.g., Spratt v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 90 Wash. 592, 156 P. 563 (1916). For a recent
case, see Bernstein, 430 A.2d 602.
12. See generally Dobbs, Conclusiveness of Personal Injury Settlements: Basic Problems 41
N.C.L. REV. 665, 666-67 (1963); Annotation, Modern Status of Rules as to Avoidance of Release
of Personal Injury Claim on Ground of Mistake as to Nature and Extent of Injuries, 13
A.L.R.4TH 686, 692 (1982).
13. See generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9-26 (3d ed.
1987); Dobbs, supra note 12, at 702-30.
14. See generally Dobbs, supra note 12, at 702-30. The following discussion assumes that
neither party to a release has engaged in fraud, misrepresentation, or overreaching. In this Note
the term "fraud" includes all deceptive behavior.
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In jurisdictions that apply orthodox contract analysis, personal
injury plaintiffs can rarely show that a release was executed pursuant
to a mutual mistake of material fact."5 Courts in these jurisdictions,
pursuant to an objective contract analysis, have reasoned that, one, the
mistake was unilateral rather than mutual because all information
about the plaintiff's condition was provided by the plaintiff, and the
defendant therefore did not make an independent mistake;16 two, the
plaintiff assumed the risk of mistake because the release expressly
acknowledged the possibility of latent injury; 7 or three, the mistake
was made in reliance on a prognosis of recovery, and therefore is a
mistake of opinion, not of fact. 8
2. Modified Contract Analysis
Jurisdictions that modify19 or override2° traditional objective con-
tract analysis recognize that the injured party's subjective intent in
releasing claims for latent injury may be an issue of fact.21 First, the
court determines whether the injured person's intent is an issue of fact.
If it is, the trier of fact must determine whether the release was "fairly
and knowingly made."22 Courts use several analytical strategies to
bypass the express language of releases. Some interpret the contract
15. But see, eg., Gleason v. Guzman, 623 P.2d 378, 385-87 (Colo. 1981) (summary judgment
for the defendant on the ground of no mutual mistake was error where there was some evidence
that the releasor was unaware of the risk of epilepsy after a head injury).
16. Eg., Pepper v. Evanson, 70 Wash. 2d 309, 422 P.2d 817 (1967), overruled on other
grounds, Simonson v. Fendell, 101 Wash. 2d 88, 675 P.2d 1218 (1984); Beaver v. Estate of
Harris, 67 Wash. 2d 621, 409 P.2d 143 (1965); see also Dobbs, supra note 12, at 722-24; cf. 3 A.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 608 (1960) (criticizing the distinction between mutual and
unilateral mistake).
17. Eg., Bennett v. Shinoda Floral, Inc., 108 Wash. 2d 386, 388, 739 P.2d 648, 649 (1987);
Hoggatt v. Jorgensen, 43 Wash. App. 782, 719 P.2d 602 (1986); see also A. CoRBIN, supra note
16, § 598; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 152, 154 (1979). Personal injury releases
typically release all future claims. The language employed in the releases in Bennett is typical: "It
is understood and agreed that this is a full and final release of all claims of every nature and kind
whatsoever, and releases claims that are known and unknown, suspected and unsuspected."
Bennett, 108 Wash. 2d at 388, 739 P.2d at 649.
18. Eg., Maltais v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 318, 386 A.2d 1264 (1978);
Lambert v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2 Wash. App. 136, 467 P.2d 214, review denied, 78
Wash. 2d 993 (1970); see also Dobbs, supra note 12, at 684-87, 709-13; Note, The Enforceability
of Personal Injury Releases, 54 U. COLO. L. REv. 277, 279-84 (1983).
19. See eg., Gleason. 623 P.2d 378 (requiring a subjective interpretation of the intent and
knowledge of the parties to a personal injury release).
20. Eg., Ranta v. Rake, 91 Idaho 376, 421 P.2d 747 (1966); Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332,
86 N.W.2d 537 (1957).
21. See, eg., Ranta, 421 P.2d at 750; Finch v. Carlton, 84 Wash. 2d 140, 144-46, 524 P.2d
898, 900-01 (1974).
22. Eg., Ranta, 421 P.2d 747; Denton, 86 N.W.2d 537; Mangini v. McClurg, 24 N.Y.2d 556,
249 N.E.2d 386, 301 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1969). In these cases, the courts tend to focus on the
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doctrine to find mutual mistake;2 3 some override contract doctrine
under a broad principle of equity;24 and others rely directly on the
public policy interest in compensating injured persons.25
B. Washington Developments
The Washington courts initially employed an objective contract
analysis of personal injury releases.26 Generally, absent fraud, a plain-
tiff could avoid a release only by presenting "clear and convincing"
evidence that both parties were mistaken as to a material fact.2 7 In
Finch v. Carlton28 the Washington Supreme Court strayed from prior
decisions by holding that a release of all claims for personal injury
could be avoided without applying objective contract doctrine. In
Finch the plaintiff had been in an automobile accident, sustaining no
apparent injury.29 He executed a personal injury release as part of a
settlement for property damage. Several months later he was hospital-
ized for internal injuries that were a result of the accident.30 When he
sued to recover for the newly discovered injuries, the insurer raised the
release as a defense.
The supreme court reversed the trial court's summary judgment for
the defendant. The court based its decision on a balancing of public
policy interests. It reasoned that while finality of settlements ordina-
rily requires that releases be upheld, the balance favors compensation
plaintiff's knowledge of injury in determining whether there is an issue of fact. The trier of fact
may consider both fairness and the plaintiff's knowledge of injury. See, e.g., infra note 32.
23. E.g., Gleason, 623 P.2d 378 (broadly construing mutual mistake).
24. E.g., Denton, 86 N.W.2d 537.
25. E.g., Ranta, 421 P.2d 747; Finch, 84 Wash. 2d 140, 524 P.2d 898.
26. See Pepper v. Evanson, 70 Wash. 2d 309, 422 P.2d 817 (1967) (release binding as a matter
of law where the plaintiff showed willingness to settle despite uncertainty regarding injuries),
overruled on other grounds, Simonson v. Fendell, 101 Wash. 2d 88, 675 P.2d 1218 (1984); Beaver
v. Estate of Harris, 67 Wash. 2d 621, 409 P.2d 143 (1965) (release binding where the plaintiff's
testimony is ambiguous, the insurer's sole source of medical information is the plaintiff, and the
plaintiff's conduct indicates knowledge that the release is final); Schwieger v. Harry W. Robbins
& Co., 48 Wash. 2d 22, 290 P.2d 984 (1955) (where terms of a release are clear, they cannot be
limited due to subsequent developments).
27. Pepper, 70 Wash. 2d at 313, 422 P.2d at 820; Beaver, 67 Wash. 2d at 626, 409 P.2d at 146;
Spratt v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 90 Wash. 592, 593-94, 156 P. 563 (1916). None of these cases
actually voided a release. The "clear and convincing evidence" standard has been used more as a
bar to avoidance than as a decision-making rule.
28. 84 Wash. 2d 140, 524 P.2d 898 (1974).
29. Id. at 141-42, 524 P.2d at 898-99.




of injured persons if a release was not "fairly and knowingly made."3 1
The trier of fact must determine the validity of the release.
32
The court acknowledged the prior use of objective contract analysis,
but made no attempt to reconcile its holding with that line of cases.33
Finch left two issues open. First, should objective contract analysis
also be discarded in cases where the plaintiff signed a release knowing
of some injury? Second, if objective contract analysis is discarded,
should the trier of fact decide whether the release was "fairly and
knowingly" made in every latent injury case?
II. BENNETT v. SHINODA FLORAL, INC.
In Bennett v. Shinoda Floral, Inc.,34 the Washington Supreme Court
addressed the questions left open in Finch. The court consolidated
two actions for personal injuries sustained in automotive accidents.35
The plaintiffs in both cases had sustained back injuries, but were told
by their physicians that they would recover and would be able to
return to work.36 The plaintiffs, without benefit of counsel, settled
with the defendants' insurers and signed releases.37 The plaintiffs later
discovered that their injuries were far more severe than originally
diagnosed.38
The plaintiffs sued to recover for the latent injuries, and both
defendants raised the releases as an affirmative defense. The courts of
31. Id. at 145-46, 524 P.2d at 901.
32. The trier of fact must consider the following factors in deciding whether a release was
fairly and knowingly made:
(1) the peculiar dignity and protection to[ sic] which the law cloaks the human person, as
contrasted with articles of commerce; (2) the inequality of the bargaining positions and
relative intelligence of the contracting parties; (3) the amount of consideration received;
(4) the likelihood of inadequate knowledge concerning future consequences of present injury
to the human body and brain; and (5) the haste, or lack thereof, with which release was
obtained.
Id., 84 Wash. 2d at 146, 524 P.2d at 901.
Since Finch was decided the Washington legislature has enacted a measure stating in part that
"[a] determination that the amount paid for a release... was unreasonable shall not affect the
validity of the agreement .... " WASH. RaV. CODE § 4.22.060(3) (1987) (effective July 26,
1981). The statute arguably requires the trier of fact to base avoidance of a release on circum-
stances other than the inadequacy of the settlement amount, such as gross bargaining inequities
or the plaintiff's unawareness of injury.
33. See Finch, 84 Wash. 2d at 143-46, 524 P.2d at 899-901.
34. 108 Wash. 2d 386, 739 P.2d 648 (1987).
35. Bennett v. Shinoda Floral, Inc., 43 Wash. App. 504, 717 P.2d 1379 (1986), rev'd, 108
Wash. 2d 386, 739 P.2d 648 (1987); Hoggatt v. Jorgensen, 43 Wash. App. 782, 719 P.2d 602
(1986), aff'd sub nor. Bennett v. Shinoda Floral, Inc., 108 Wash. 2d 386, 739 P.2d 648 (1987).
36. Bennett v. Shinoda Floral, Inc., 108 Wash. 2d 386, 388-90, 739 P.3d 648, 649-50 (1987).
37. Id. at 389-91, 739 P.2d at 650-51.
38. Id at 389-91, 739 P.2d at 649-51.
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appeal reached conflicting conclusions in the two cases. In Bennett v.
Shinoda Floral, Inc.,39 the court held that Finch required the trier of
fact to determine whether the release was "fairly and knowingly"
made.4 In Hoggatt v. Jorgensen4 the court upheld the release without
mentioning Finch, asserting that under contract law the plaintiff had
assumed the risk of mistake by signing the release.42 The Washington
Supreme Court characterized the issue in both cases as whether injury
"victims are bound, as a matter of law, by releases executed when they
knew they had been injured, but did not know the extent or conse-
quences of the injuries."
4 3
A. Public Policy Balancing
The first question was whether the court's rule in Finch extended to
the present facts. The court held that it did not." The court used a
public policy analysis to determine that the "fairly and knowingly"
test could not be used if the releasor knew of some injury at the time of
release. It observed that the two competing policies governing con-
tested releases are the needs for compensation of accident victims and
for finality of settlements of disputed claims.45 The court expressed
concern that avoidance of releases executed with knowledge of injuries
would impair the finality of settlements.46 The incentive to settle
claims would be reduced, and both parties and courts would suffer a
39. 43 Wash. App. 504, 717 P.2d 1379 (1986).
40. The plaintiff's physician stated that his "injury would heal within a reasonable time
period so that he could go back to work." Id. at 505, 717 P.2d at 1380. The defendant's insurer
promised to pay wage loss and medical expenses until he could return to work. The insurer later
received a report that Bennett's prognosis was still undetermined, and four months after the
accident terminated payments and offered a final settlement of $5,000. Id. Bennett, believing the
settlement would meet his needs until he returned to work, signed a general release. Id. at 506,
717 P.2d at 1381. More than a year after settlement, Bennett was found to have a herniated
intervertebral disc and a degenerative disc disease that had been precipitated by the accident. He
was permanently disabled. Id. at 506-07, 717 P.2d at 1381-82.
41. 43 Wash. App. 782, 719 P.2d 602 (1986), aff'd sub nom. Bennett v. Shinoda Floral, Inc.,
108 Wash. 2d 386, 739 P.2d 648 (1987).
42. The plaintiff, Hoggatt, was diagnosed initially as having compression fractures of two
vertebrae. Two months later he negotiated with the defendant's insurer for a settlement of
$26,500. Hoggatt consulted other physicians both before and after the settlement. Two years
after the accident, a neurologist "diagnosed a probable mild spinal cord injury ...with an
associated mild paraparesis." Id. at 784, 719 P.2d at 603. Hoggatt was subsequently found to be
disabled for the purposes of receiving Social Security Disability benefits. Bennett v. Shinoda
Floral, Inc., 108 Wash. 2d 386, 391, 739 P.2d 648, 651 (1987).
43. Bennett, 108 Wash. 2d at 388, 739 P.2d at 649.
44. Id. at 394, 739 P.2d at 652.
45. Id. at 394-95, 739 P.2d at 652-53.
46. Id. at 395, 739 P.2d at 653.
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flood of litigation.4 7 Where the plaintiff executes a release with no
knowledge of any injury, the policy balance tips in favor of compensa-




The court followed an objective contract analysis to determine
whether the release was voidable due to mutual mistake.49 The con-
tract analysis was nearly identical to that used by the court of appeals
in Hoggatt.50 The court would not void a release on the basis of
mutual mistake if the party seeking avoidance bore the risk of mistake;
it reasoned that a party assumes the risk by executing the release
despite a "conscious uncertainty" regarding the facts.5 1 Because the
releasors knew of some uncertainty regarding their injuries when they
signed the releases,52 they assumed the risk of latent injury. 3
III. ANALYSIS
The court's application of objective contract analysis in Bennett
undermines the compensatory purpose of personal injury settlements.
Personal injury victims do not have the freedom to contract that justi-
fies strict adherence to the terms of commercial contracts. Further-
more, the court's application of contract doctrine is analytically
inconsistent with Finch v. Carlton. Washington contract law never in
practice allows relief in latent injury cases, despite recitations that
relief is available for mutual mistake. Yet in Finch the court permitted
relief despite the existence of an unambiguous release.
The court's balancing of policies was not a true balancing test that
assigned values to the policies and weighed them on a common scale.
It was instead an arbitrary classification of persons who, in the court's
opinion, had assumed the risk of latent injury. The resulting rule
takes the factual issues underlying assumption of risk from where they
belong-with the trier of fact. A true balance between the competing
policies would address the weight of the interests in each case; this
could be done adequately by structuring the burdens of proof at trial.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 396-97, 739 P.2d at 653-54.
50. Compare id at 396-97, 739 P.2d at 653-54 with Hoggatt v. Jorgensen, 43 Wash. App.
782, 785-87, 719 P.2d 602, 603-05 (1986).
51. Bennett, 108 Wash. 2d at 396-97, 739 P.2d at 653-54.




A. Objective Contract Analysis Is Inappropriate for Personal Injury
Releases
1. Objective Contract Doctrine Is Based on Normative Assumptions
Inappropriate in Personal Injury Cases
The Washington Supreme Court's application of contract doctrine
in Bennett disregards the need to make personal injury victims whole
through compensation. Contract law strives to facilitate transactions
by ensuring some security for the parties to the transaction 4.5  It is
directed primarily at encouraging economically efficient transac-
tions;55 a contract may not be avoided simply because one party struck
a bad bargain. 6 In contrast, personal injury settlements resolve
underlying tort claims; tort law is concerned with compensation for
the injured,57 not with promotion of economically efficient transac-
tions.58 If private compensation is not forthcoming, the burden is
shifted away from the parties and onto society at large.5 ' The contrac-
tual aspects of personal injury releases are therefore unsupported by
the economic justifications underlying contract doctrine.
a. Personal Injury Releases Are Not Entered into Freely by Both
Parties
The free market assumptions of contract law are valid only with
respect to the defendant's insurer. Contract doctrine generally
assumes that parties enter a contract freely for their own benefit.'
The assumptions are arguably valid with respect to the insurer in a
personal injury claim. The insurer profits because settlement provides
closure, while premiums gathered from other policyholders offset the
payment.61 The insurer acts freely in drafting the release and agreeing
54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 comment a (1979).
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16 introductory note and reporter's
note (1979).
56. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 11.10, at 777-78 (1973).
57. Tort law arguably has an important deterrent function in addition to compensation.
However, this does not appear to enhance the appropriateness of applying contract doctrine to
personal injury releases.
58. D. DOBBS, supra note 56, § 8.1, at 540.
59. Id.
60. Absolute freedom of contract increasingly has been circumscribed by regulation where
one party has no real bargaining power. J. CALAMARI, supra note 13, at 6. Nevertheless, "[most
of contract law is premised upon a model consisting of two alert individuals, mindful of their self-
interest, hammering out an agreement by a process of hard bargaining." Id.; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16 introductory note and reporter's note (1979)
(explaining economic efficiency theory of contract remedies).




to settle; if a settlement is unacceptable, the insurer can wait for a
more favorable moment or litigate the claim.
From the injured person's viewpoint, a settlement is a fundamen-
tally different transaction. There is no profit, though the injured per-
son may seek as much money as possible; the aim is to compensate,
not to enrich the victim.62 Furthermore, the victim lacks free choice
in two respects. First, the need for compensation is not assumed vol-
untarily, in contrast to parties who seek business contract opportuni-
ties. Second, the victim may have no free choice in settlement due to
immediate financial pressures. Medical and other expenses, loss of
income, and the inevitable delay in litigation may combine to make
even an unfavorable settlement appear attractive.63 Under these cir-
cumstances, early compensation is less a boon to the plaintiff than a
bargaining lever for the defendant.
b. Personal Injury Victims Cannot Opt out of Bad Bargains
by Breaching
Personal injury releases also depart from the free market model
because the injured party cannot efficiently breach the agreement.
Either party, acting in its own self-interest, can breach a commercial
contract if the cost of performance exceeds the liability for damages. 4
The breaching party in effect exchanges a loss on performance for less
severe loss in damages.65 However, this option is available to personal
injury releasors only if a court voids the release. The releasor cannot
unilaterally decide to breach the agreement.66 The efficient breach
62. See iL at 778.
63. The plaintiff's vulnerability and the insurer's tactics in Bennett illustrate a forced
settlement. Bennett had little chance of finding employment after his injury. See Bennett v.
Shinoda Floral, Inc., 43 Wash. App. 504, 505, 717 P.2d 1379, 1380 (1986), rey'd, 108 Wash. 2d
386, 739 P.2d 648 (1987). He was under financial pressure to settle because he had almost no
cash resources and the defendant's insurer had just cut off wage loss payments. Id. at 505-06,
717 P.2d at 1381. Bennett's unfamiliarity with legal matters put him at a further disadvantage in
negotiation. Id. at 505, 717 P.2d at 1380.
64. An award of expectation damages puts the non-breaching party in the same position as if
the contract had been performed. This remedy gives "an incentive to break the contract if, but
only if, [the breaching party] gains enough from the breach that he can compensate the injured
party for his losses and still retain some of the benefits from the breach." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRAs ch. 16 introductory note and reporter's note (1979).
65. Id.
66. See Ferson, The Nature* of Legal Transactions and Juristic Acts: Analysis of Common
Factors and Variations, 31 CORNELL L. Q. 105 (1945). Dean Ferson argues that "exchanges,"
which would include releases, are distinguishable from contracts. Contracts create obligations
through executory promises, whereas exchanges create no obligation because they are
consummated at the moment of the exchange. Id. at 110-16. A releasor therefore cannot breach
a release, because it is a completed transaction; there is no promise to be broken.
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that justifies a strict adherence to commercial contracts is not available
to personal injury victims. Personal injury releases therefore lack the
economic underpinnings that generally support contract analysis.
c. Personal Injury Releases Are Unique Because They Resolve
Claims for Human Injury
Many authorities have recognized that personal injury releases are a
unique species of agreement.67 The Washington Supreme Court rec-
ognized the fundamental difference between commercial contracts and
personal injury releases in Finch." However, in Bennett the court
abandoned that recognition by turning again to contract analysis. The
remoteness of contract analysis from the needs of injured persons is
accentuated by the Bennett court's reliance on a municipal finance
case, Public Utility District No. 1 v. Washington Public Power Supply
System 9 ("WPPSS") to support its contract analysis.7°
The court's analogy between the WPPSS contracts and personal
injury settlements is incompatible with the concern for injury victims
espoused in Finch. WPPSS involved loans from special municipal dis-
tricts to WPPSS to finance the "mothballing" of incomplete nuclear
power plants.7 ' The risk of loss in WPPSS was substantial, but the
agreement was entered freely, and the potential loss was solely eco-
nomic. In contrast, the plaintiffs in Finch and Bennett did not choose
to be in a position requiring compensation, and their loss due to mis-
take was a failure to be compensated for severe personal loss. The
court in Bennett did not recognize these distinctions.
67. E.g., Finch v. Carlton, 84 Wash. 2d 140, 143-44, 524 P.2d 898, 900 (1974); J. CALAMARI,
supra note 13, § 9-26(d); D. DOBBS, supra note 56, § 11.10, at 775, 777-78; Note, supra note 18,
at 290-91.
68. The court in Finch stated that jurisdictions applying strict contract principles to personal
injury releases "appear not to differentiate between standards applicable to commercial
transactions and those peculiar to personal injuries." Finch, 84 Wash. 2d at 143-44, 524 P.2d at
900.
69. 104 Wash. 2d 353, 362, 705 P.2d 1195, 1203 (1985), corrected, 713 P.2d 1109, (Wash.
1986).
70. Bennett v. Shinoda Floral, Inc., 108 Wash. 2d 386, 396-97, 739 P.2d 648, 653-54 (1987).
71. The parties had mistakenly believed that the Public Utility Districts had legal authority to
obligate themselves to WPPSS under an earlier agreement. WPPSS asserted that the loan
agreements were void due to a mutual mistake as to a basic assumption of the contract. The
court held that the authority to enter the earlier agreement was not an assumption basic to the
loan. The court also stated that WPPSS had assumed the risk of any mistake by proceeding
despite a conscious uncertainty regarding the facts. The uncertainty stemmed from a prior legal
challenge to the existence of WPPSS. WPPSS, 104 Wash. 2d at 362-63, 705 P.2d at 1203-04.
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2. Contract Doctrine Under Current Washington Law Cannot
Permit Avoidance of Any Personal Injury Release
Although some jurisdictions have interpreted contract doctrine to
allow avoidance of personal injury releases, the decisions of Washing-
ton courts employing objective contract analysis make avoidance
impossible.72 The plaintiff's opportunity to show mutual mistake is
illusory because the courts treat mutual mistake as an issue of law,
nullifying any factual showings.73 A more tempered contract analysis
would follow the traditional doctrine, but recognize that the mutual
mistake doctrine is an application of law to fact. The plaintiffs could
then show that they did not actually bargain for or intend to assume
the risk of latent injury. The law would accordingly be more respon-
sive to the special plight of personal injury victims.
a. Unilateral Mistake
Washington courts uphold releases if medical information about the
plaintiff is provided to the insurer solely by the plaintiff or the plain-
tiff's physician.74 The courts assert that the only mistake about the
plaintiff's condition was made by the plaintiff. The insurer did not
make an independent mistake. Therefore the mistake was unilateral,
and a release cannot be avoided on the basis of unilateral mistake.75
The "unilateral mistake" line of reasoning distorts the nature of the
parties' mistake. The source of erroneous information is not impor-
tant in distinguishing a unilateral from a mutual mistake. The crucial
issue instead is whether both parties acted on an erroneous assumption
regarding a vital existing fact." Courts may void a contract for
mutual mistake because the transaction turns out to be quite different
from the exchange the parties had contemplated. 7 The "mutuality" is
therefore in the parties' states of mind, not in their acts.
72. The court in Finch was able to permit avoidance only by disregarding contract analysis
altogether. See Finch v. Carlton, 84 Wash. 2d 140, 524 P.2d 898 (1974).
73. See, eg., Pepper v. Evanson, 70 Wash. 2d 309, 422 P.2d 817 (1967), overruled on other
grounds, Simonson v. Fendell, 101 Wash. 2d 88, 675 P.2d 1218 (1984); Beaver v. Estate of
Harris, 67 Wash. 2d 621, 409 P.2d 143 (1965); Schwieger v. Harry W. Robbins & Co., 48 Wash.
2d 22, 290 P.2d 984 (1955).
74. See Pepper, 70 Wash. 2d at 315-16, 422 P.2d at 821-22; Beaver, 67 Wash. 2d at 628-29,
409 P.2d at 148; Woods v. Gamache, 14 Wash. App. 685, 687, 544 P.2d 144, 145 (1975).
75. Some jurisdictions allow avoidance of personal injury releases on the basis of unilateral
mistake. See Witt v. Watkins, 579 P.2d 1065 (Alaska 1978); Gleason v. Guzman, 623 P.2d 378
(Colo. 198 1) For a general critique of the distinction between mutual and unilateral mistake, see
3 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 608; Rabin, A Proposed Black-Letter Rule Concerning Mistaken
Assumptions in Bargain Transactions, 45 TEx. L. REV. 1273, 1277-79 (1967).
76. J. CALAMARI, supra note 13, § 9-26, at 379.
77. Id.
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Assuming that the plaintiff's medical information has been fully dis-
closed to the defendant, the parties to a personal injury settlement
have equal knowledge and are under the same misapprehension
regarding the facts. If the injured person assumed the risk of mistake,
then the release is binding;"8 but the injured person should have an
opportunity to show the trier of fact that he or she did not assume the
risk. Under Bennett and prior Washington law that opportunity has
been denied.
b. Assumption of Risk
The court in Bennett stated that a person who executes a release
knowing of unhealed injuries assumes the risk of any mistake regard-
ing the extent of the injuries,7 9 citing the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts and Corbin on Contracts. 80 The court neglected the principle,
established in Finch and implied by both the Restatement and Profes-
sor Corbin, that a releasor's assumption of risk is an issue of fact. The
court in Bennett quoted Professor Corbin's statement that to prevail,
the plaintiff must show that a latent injury "was outside of his contem-
plation when he executed the release."'" The court concluded from
this statement that the plaintiffs alone bore the risk of mistake because
uncertainty regarding their condition must always exist.8"
78. See, e.g., Pub. Util. Dist. No. I v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 104 Wash. 2d 353,
362, 705 P.2d 1195, 1203 (1985), corrected, 713 P.2d 1109 (Wash. 1986); see also 3 A. CORBIN,
supra note 16, § 598; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 152, 154 (1979).
79. Bennett v. Shinoda Floral, Inc., 108 Wash. 2d 386, 397, 739 P.2d 648, 654 (1987).
80. Id. at 396-97, 739 P.2d at 653-54 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 152, 154 (1979) and 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 16, § 598). Section 152(1) of the Restatement
provides:
Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on
which the contract was made has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances,
the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party unless he bears the risk of the
mistake under the rule stated in § 154.
Section 154 provides:
A party bears the risk of a mistake when ... (b) he is aware, at the time the contract is
made, that he has only limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake
relates but treats his limited knowledge as sufficient....
81. Bennett, 108 Wash. 2d at 397, 739 P.2d at 654 (quoting 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 16,
§ 598). The full quote states:
[T]he claimant must show that an injury existed that was outside of his contemplation when
he executed the release. In settling any such claim, the claimant knows that there is some
degree of uncertainty. In so far as he is aware of uncertainty respecting his future harm and
loss he is consciously exchanging this uncertainty for the liquidated amount received in
settlement. To this extent the release is not voidable for mistake.
(Emphasis added.)
82. Bennett, 108 Wash. 2d at 397, 739 P.2d at 654.
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The court misread Professor Corbin's text. Professor Corbin notes
that the plaintiff in every settlement knows there is some uncer-
tainty.83 However, he also recognizes that the plaintiff is not necessar-
ily aware of the full extent of the uncertainty, and should be bound by
the release only to the extent of his or her awareness. 4 The Bennett
court, in contrast, read the passage to mean that a plaintiff who signs a
release bargains for the risk of all latent injury, if there is any uncer-
tainty at all regarding the plaintiff's condition.85 The court's interpre-
tation of Professor Corbin's treatise disregards the possibility that a
latent injury may have been entirely beyond the plaintiff's contempla-
tion at the time of release. The Bennett court denied the injured party
any opportunity to show that the particular injury was in fact outside
of his or her contemplation. In determining that any injured person
who signs a release assumes the entire risk of latent injury, 6 the court
inappropriately interposes a rule of law where there may be a genuine
issue of fact.
c. Fact-Opinion Distinction
The Washington Court of Appeals in Lambert v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 7 held that an erroneous medical
prognosis of recovery cannot justify avoidance of a release, because it
is a mistake of opinion about future events rather than a mistake of
fact. 8 However, a physician's opinion is traceable to factual observa-
tions, and if the observations do not correspond to the patient's true
condition they could rightly be considered mistakes of fact. Some
jurisdictions have recognized a physician's opinion as a statement of
fact because of the patient's reliance on the statement.8 9 Furthermore,
the Washington Supreme Court has recognized mistaken legal opin-
ions as a legitimate basis for mutual mistake outside of the personal
injury setting.90 The court would act consistently if it also recognized
mistaken medical prognoses as grounds for mutual mistake; but as in
83. See supra note 81.
84. Id
85. Bennett, 108 Wash. 2d at 397, 739 P.2d at 654.
86. See id at 388, 739 P.2d at 649.
87. 2 Wash. App. 136, 467 P.2d 214, review denied, 78 Wash. 2d 993 (1970).
88. Ia at 140-41, 467 P.2d at 218.
89. See, eg., Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537, 540 (1957). See generally
Dobbs, supra note 12, at 684-87.
90. In Chemical Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 102 Wash. 2d 874, 691 P.2d
524 (1984), cert. denied sub nom. Haberman v. Chemical Bank, 471 U.S. 1065, cert. denied sub
nom. Chemical Bank v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 471 U.S. 1075 (1985), the court held that an
agreement between municipal corporations and a joint operating agency was void due to mutual
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the unilateral mistake and assumption of risk cases, the court has
upheld releases as a matter of law.
3. Failure To Permit Avoidance Conflicts with the Court's
Reasoning in Finch
The Washington Supreme Court's decision in Finch91 recognized
that compelling equity and public policy arguments demand avoidance
of releases in at least some cases.92 The court's rationale was inconsis-
tent with its prior use of objective contract analysis. The court
resolved the inconsistency by simply disregarding contract doctrine.9 3
The court in Bennett reverted to the strict contract approach, but gave
no reason why its decision did not overrule Finch. Instead it simply
asserted that the public policy balance required Finch to be limited to
its facts.
94
The distinction made in Bennett is one of fact, not law. If the court
rejects contract doctrine in Finch, then it should reject application of
contract doctrine to all personal injury releases, unless it can distin-
guish a class of cases for which contract analysis is uniquely appropri-
ate. Variations of fact may justifiably determine different outcomes,
but they do not provide an analytically sound basis for suspending
contract analysis. The Bennett court's differentiation between injured
persons who sign releases knowing of injury and those who do so
unknowingly failed to distinguish such a class.
B. The Public Policy Balancing Employed in Bennett Is Unsuitable
for Resolving Issues of Fact
In both Finch and Bennett the court relied on a balance of compet-
ing policy interests to decide whether to give the issue of voidability to
the trier of fact,95 yet in neither case did the court articulate an opti-
mum balance between the public policies. In Finch, the court asserted
that the better policy approach was to favor compensation over finality
mistake. Chemical Bank 102 Wash. 2d at 898-99, 691 P.2d at 538-39. All parties had been
mistaken regarding the legal authority of the municipalities to enter the agreement. Id.
The parties in Chemical Bank did not rely on existing fact; they instead relied on opinions
regarding an unresolved question of law. The opinions are analogous to a medical prognosis
because a legal opinion implicitly or explicitly anticipates the outcome of future litigation, just as
medical opinions anticipate the outcome of medical treatment.
91. Finch v. Carlton, 84 Wash. 2d 140, 524 P.2d 898 (1974).
92. See id. at 144-46, 524 P.2d at 900-01.
93. See id.
94. Bennett v. Shinoda Floral, Inc., 108 Wash. 2d 386, 396, 739 P.2d 648, 653 (1987).
95. Id. at 394-96, 739 P.2d at 652-53; Finch, 84 Wash. 2d at 145-46, 524 P.2d at 900-01.
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of releases.96 In Bennett, the court simply turned the assertion
around.97 While the Bennett court correctly recognized the fairness of
allowing avoidance in Finch by reiterating the exception to objective
contract analysis,"9 it did not balance the policy concerns. Instead, the
court set an arbitrary limit to the interest in finality: where the injured
person knows of no injury, fairness requires that the finality interest be
terminated.
1. The Public Policy Balancing in Bennett Creates an Excessively
Rigid Legal Rule
The court in Bennett undermined the potential benefits of a balanc-
ing test by engaging in "definitional balancing." 99 Definitional balanc-
ing creates a general rule that makes further balancing in future
decisions unnecessary."° The Bennett court created such a rule by
stating that the "fairly and knowingly" test cannot be applied to a
release if the releasor knew of some injury at the time of execution. 10 1
Definitional balancing provides some certainty for future cases, but it
may fail to accurately map the facts of subsequent cases. 0 2
The Bennett rule displays this mapping problem. The rule divides
releasors into two classes. First, it reasonably posits that those who
sign releases with no knowledge of any injury have not entertained the
possibility of latent injuries, and so might not have assumed that
risk.103 Second, the rule posits that those who sign a release knowing
of some injury have assumed all risk of latent injury, because they
must have considered the possibility of latent injuries."° The second
class is arbitrarily over-inclusive. It fails to recognize yet a third class:
releasors who are aware of some risk, but who reasonably fail to con-
template the possibility of the injury that later surfaces. The latter
class should, by the standards of fairness established in Finch, be
allowed to show that they were reasonably unaware of the magnitude
of the risk; yet under the Bennett rule they are presumed to have
96. Finch, 84 Wash. 2d at 144-45, 524 P.2d at 900.
97. Bennett, 108 Wash. 2d at 395-96, 739 P.2d at 652-53.
98. Id at 395, 739 P.2d at 653.
99. Definitional balancing is the one-time use of a balancing test to create a legal rule. In
subsequent cases the courts apply the rule to the facts without weighing the interests in each case.
In contrast, ad hoc balancing tests require the courts to weigh the opposing interests in each case.
See Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in theAge of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 979 (1987); see also
M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.03, at 2-17 (1984).
100. Aleinikoff, supra note 99, at 979.
101. See Bennett, 108 Wash. 2d at 388, 739 P.2d at 649.
102. See Aleinikoff, supra note 99, at 979-81.
103. Bennett, 108 Wash. 2d at 395, 739 P.2d at 653.
104. Id
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assumed all risk. Thus, the balancing employed in Bennett is insensi-
tive to the competing interests of compensation and finality within
each case. 105 The courts can adjust to new variations of fact only by
abrogating the rule and striking a new balance. 106
2. The Public Policy Balancing in Bennett Fails To Assign Values
to the Competing Interests
The Bennett court framed the issues in terms of public policy bal-
ancing, yet it decided the case without articulating the weights of the
competing interests. 107 A balancing test by definition assigns values to
competing interests and weighs them against each other. 10 8 A funda-
mental problem inherent in balancing tests is finding a common scale
of values-a way to assess the relative value of "apples and oranges."
The difficulty is not that disparate social interests cannot be weighed,
but that there are no objectively established values or weights.' 9 The
court in Bennett neither established a common scale nor assigned val-
ues to the policy interests. The distinction between Finch and Bennett
that tipped the policy scale was the presence of a known injury. 10
This is a determination of fact, not an assignment of value. The court
neglected the careful weighing of interests that is essential to balancing
tests.
C. Proposed Rule for Determining the Validity of Personal Injury
Releases
In Finch the Washington Supreme Court correctly recognized that
the need for compensation of injured persons may override the express
language of a release.' 11 The court later recognized in Bennett that an
evidentiary hearing on every challenged release would be a waste of
personal and judicial resources.11 2 Unfortunately, the rigid Bennett.
105. "In a good many cases it can be found that the policy of finality must bow to the policy
that makes the tortfeasor pay, and that decision must be made anew in each case." Dobbs, supra
note 12, at 729.
106. Aleinikoff, supra note 99, at 978-81.
107. See generally id. at 972-76 (problems of assigning values in balancing tests).
108. Professor Aleinikoff defines a balancing opinion in constitutional analysis as "a judicial
opinion that analyzes a constitutional question by identifying interests implicated by the case and
reaches a decision or constructs a rule of constitutional law by explicitly or implicitly assigning
values to the identified interests." Aleinikoff, supra note 99, at 945.
109. Professor Aleinikoff points out that the metaphorical apples and oranges can be weighed
against each other; one simply gives them a price per pound and puts them on a produce scale.
Aleinikoff, supra note 99, at 973.
110. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
11. Finch v. Carlton, 84 Wash. 2d 140, 145-46, 524 P.2d 898, 900-01 (1974).
112. Bennett v. Shinoda Floral, Inc., 108 Wash. 2d 386, 395, 739 P.2d 648, 653 (1987).
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rule does more than simply screen out unwarranted claims. By taking
the issue of assumption of risk from the trier of fact, it denies compen-
sation to some persons who did not in fact assume the risk of latent
injury.
1. Two-Part Test
A two-part test for avoidance would enable the courts to screen out
unwarranted claims at an early stage, while treating the intent of the
parties as an issue of fact. Both parts of the test would require findings
of fact, each part beginning with a rebuttable presumption that the
releasor bargains for the risk of latent injury. The first part evaluates
the releasor's intent objectively. It screens out claims where the plain-
tiff either assumed or should have assumed the risk of latent injury.
The plaintiff must show that the known injury would not signal to a
reasonable person that there was any risk of the latent injury actually
sustained. A plaintiff who fails to make an adequate showing is
deemed to have assumed the risk of latent injury, and the release is
upheld.
A plaintiff who makes an adequate showing under the first part of
the test must then show that, under the Finch standards, 113 the release
was not fairly and knowingly made. The release is still presumed to be
binding, but the plaintiff may overcome the presumption by producing
evidence of objective manifestations of the plaintiff's intent.11 4 The
trier of fact must then determine whether the evidence shows that the
plaintiff subjectively intended to assume the risk of latent injury, and
whether the circumstances of the execution of the release were fair.
2. Results of Proposed Rule
The proposed rule gives proper weight to the competing policy
interests. It recognizes the unique need for compensation of personal
injuries by looking to the intent of the parties even though the release
may appear complete and unambiguous. It recognizes the interest in
finality by placing the burden of proof on the releasor at both stages of
the test. The rule is internally consistent, applying to all personal
injury releases without invoking or suspending bodies of doctrine
depending on the fact pattern. 1
113. For the full text of the standards promulgated in Finch, see supra note 32.
114. See supra note 32.
115. The rule's internal consistency is a cure for the conflict between Bennett and Finch as to
whether contract doctrine should apply to personal injury releases. See supra notes 93-94 and
accompanying text. Under the proposed rule, contract doctrine would not be determinative,
although basic contract principles would be respected in the presumptions favoring the release.
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The rule may prompt insurers to take measures designed to guaran-
tee that their releases are binding. 116 The measures could include
efforts to inform injury victims about the risks of latent injury, and to
ensure that the victims actually bargain for the risks. 1 7 If these meas-
ures are effective, the proposed rule may result in better-informed
rather than better-compensated injury victims. This alternative result
would also be laudable because, one, well-informed victims are more
likely to bargain carefully, and two, courts would have better evidence
of the actual intent of the parties to challenged releases.
3. Resemblance to Diagnosis-Prognosis Analysis
The new rule will have results that are similar to those reached
under the diagnosis-prognosis analysis." 8 In most cases the rule will
deny relief for latent injuries that are complications of known injuries,
because complications are a foreseeable risk. Complications have been
characterized as mistakes in prognosis and relief thereby denied." 9
The rule would in most cases permit avoidance if a latent injury were
in a different body part than a known injury. Similarly, the diagnosis-
prognosis rule would also allow avoidance, because this is a mistake of
diagnosis.
Despite similar results, the new rule is not subject to the criticism
leveled at the diagnosis-prognosis rule. The diagnosis-prognosis dis-
tinction has been attacked as being an ineffectual attempt to imple-
ment mutual mistake doctrine. 2 ° However, the functional standard
advocated here does not rely on mutual mistake doctrine, avoiding
this first criticism. Critics also note that the diagnosis-prognosis rule
does not allocate risk according to the actual intent of the parties.'
2 1
In contrast, the proposed rule attempts to mirror the intent of the par-
ties through findings of fact.
116. See Levit, Validity of Claimant's Release with Respect to Unknown Injuries; 494 INS. L.J.
152 (1964) (strategies for bolstering the security of releases in the wake of Casey v. Proctor, 59
Cal. 2d 97, 378 P.2d 579, 28 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1963), where release was avoided due to unknown
injury).
117. Id. at 155.
118. Under the diagnosis-prognosis rule, courts permit avoidance of a personal injury release
if a physician has made a mistaken diagnosis-which is a mistake of fact-but not if the
physician made a mistaken prognosis, which is a mistake of opinion. See supra notes 18, 87-88
and accompanying text.
119. E.g., Lambert v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2 Wash. App. 136, 467 P.2d 214,
review denied, 78 Wash. 2d 993 (1970).





4. Proposed Rule Would Not Impair the Public Policy Favoring
Settlement
Contrary to the fears expressed in Bennett, 122 insurers would have
ample reason to settle out of court, even under a broader application
of the Finch standards. The proposed rule still favors contract finality,
with the burden of proof on the releasor to show at two stages that the
release should be avoided. Objective contract analysis is not essential
to preserving finality. In several Washington cases the plaintiffs'
behavior showed an intent to be bound by the challenged releases, ren-
dering the courts' mutual mistake analysis superfluous. 123 The new
rule applied to these cases would have reached the same result without
the doctrinal contortions of mutual mistake. Furthermore, the word-
ing of releases will tend to convince would-be challengers that the
releases bar successful action."2 Thus, releases are likely to be chal-
lenged only where injuries are substantially worse than bargained for
in the settlement.
IV. CONCLUSION
Bennett v. Shinoda Floral, Inc., is open to at least two interpreta-
tions. First, it may be viewed broadly, announcing a rule that almost
uniformly prevents personal injury victims from avoiding releases on
the grounds of latent injury. A second, narrower view would have
Bennett stand for the proposition that a person with an unhealed
injury who signs a release may not avoid the release due to unexpected
severity or symptoms of that injury. Given the doctrinal and public
policy inconsistencies in Bennett, the narrower view is preferable.
Bennett should be limited to cases where the known injury and the
latent injury are closely connected.
The court's use of contract analysis was inappropriate for a personal
injury release, and its public policy analysis failed to articulate the rel-
ative values of the competing policies. Objective contract doctrine is
based on free market assumptions that are remote from the economic
and human realities of personal injury settlements. While courts could
manipulate the rules of mutual mistake to permit avoidance of releases
in some cases, a simpler solution would be to recognize that the pri-
122. See Bennett v. Shinoda Floral, Inc., 108 Wash. 2d 386, 395, 739 P.2d 648, 653 (1987).
The court in Bennett evinces a concern for parties burdened by litigation. Id at 395, 739 P.2d at
653.
123. See Beaver v. Estate of Harris, 67 Wash. 2d 621,409 P.2d 143 (1965); Lambert, 2 Wash.
App. 136, 467 P.2d 214.
124. Dobbs, supra note 12, at 672.
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vate allocation of risk in a personal injury release is an issue of fact.
Public policy balancing is a useful technique for focusing directly on
policy interests. Responsive balancing between finality of settlements
and compensating the injured requires attention to the facts of each
case. In Bennett, however, the court failed to establish a common
scale for weighing the opposing interests, and propounded a rule that
is insensitive to the plight of some personal injury victims.
The court's concern for finality of settlements could be incorporated
into a rule that allows the trier of fact to search out the facts behind
contested personal injury releases. The injured parties would have an
opportunity to show that they did not in fact assume the risk of latent
injury. By imposing the burden of proof on the injured person at both
stages of a two-part test, courts could both promote the policy favor-
ing the finality of settlements and allow personal injury victims a
chance to receive full compensation.
Robert A. Radcliffe
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